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INTRODUCTION
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services,' the United
States Supreme Court quietly revolutionized antitrust jurispru-
dence. Holding that "difficult and costly" information gaps in mar-
* Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., Dartmouth Col-
lege, 1968; J.D., Yale Law School, 1971; M.P.H., Johns Hopkins University, 1987. The
author wishes to thank Kirbie Knutson and Joyce Foszcz Clough for their excellent edi-
torial and research assistance, respectively; and the Faculty Research Fund of the DePaul
University College of Law for its generous support.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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kets for "complex durable goods" can confer "market power" on
sellers in those markets, regardless of their market share, 2 the
Supreme Court significantly altered the most critical definition in
antitrust law. Because information gaps of the kind recognized in
Kodak exist in almost every market, cannot be measured with any
degree of accuracy, are often of indeterminate cause, and are virtu-
ally impossible to remedy, the new methodology announced by the
Court in Kodak threatens to confuse and complicate antitrust prac-
tice and doctrine for many years to come.
The Supreme Court appears neither to have intended to rede-
fine the concept of market power nor to have considered the defini-
tional implications of its decision. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority in Kodak, characterized the controversy before the Court as
"yet another case that concerns the standard for summary judgment
in an antitrust controversy,"' hardly the stuff of revolutionary pro-
nouncements. And though Justice Scalia, in his dissent,4 disagreed
strongly with that characterization, he too ignored the definitional
change, arguing that the case presented only "a very narrow," albeit
"extremely important," question about the substantive law of tying
arrangements and attempted monopolization.5
When analyzing the Kodak opinion, commentators will doubt-
less focus on some of its more obvious problems. Kodak raises sig-
nificant questions about the vitality of the per se rule of illegality in
tie-in cases.6 It apparently rejects the highly theoretical approach to
2. See id. at 2085-87.
3. Id. at 2076.
4. Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.
5. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2092 (Scalia,J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has defined
a tying arrangement, also known as a tie-in, as "an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other sup-
plier." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
6. Courts have taken two separate approaches to antitrust allegations under section
1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (prohibiting certain conduct in restraint of
trade)-the rule of reason and the per se rule. Because most business conduct could be
deemed to be "in restraint of trade," the Sherman Act has been interpreted to make
illegal only unreasonable restraints of trade. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se
and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 689 (1991).
Under the "rule of reason" standard, courts engage in a factual inquiry into the "com-
petitive circumstances and justifications of business conduct" to determine the reasona-
bleness of any alleged restraint. Id.
The "per se" rule of illegality developed in response to the burdensome, and often
unnecessary, factual inquiry under the "rule of reason" standard. Under the per se rule,
"[p]ractices clearly having a 'pernicious effect on competition' and lacking 'any redeem-
ing virtue' could be conclusively presumed to be illegal without any inquiry into compet-
itive purpose or market effect." Id. at 691 (citations omitted). This categorical and
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issues of antitrust economics adopted by the Court over the past
fifteen years.7 The decision also declares that the parts and services
provided for its own equipment by a single company can themselves
constitute relevant markets for antitrust purposes, even though that
company has only a small market share in the primary equipment
market.' The first wave of post-Kodak commentary turned to these
problems immediately,9 but their significance is dwarfed by Kodak's
inconspicuous but profound alteration of the central term in the vo-
cabulary of antitrust.
Embedded within the "garden variety" summary judgment is-
sues described by the Kodak majority and the narrow substantive
concerns of the dissent lies a new-and radically expanded-defini-
tion of "market power." Because "market power" is a uniform con-
cept in antitrust law and its existence and possession is a
precondition to liability for practically every major antitrust of-
fense, ' 0 the Supreme Court's expansive redefinition of that term will
change the nature of the market power inquiry in many, if not all,
absolutist approach has the weakness of occasional overbreadth, but it reduces litigation
time and expense and provides clear guidelines for business. Id. at 691-92.
In both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, Kodak offered
several business justifications for its allegedly anticompetitive practices. Kodak, 112 S.
Ct. at 2079. Although the Ninth Circuit found Kodak's tying agreements to be arguably
unlawful per se, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d 612, 617 (9th
Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992), and although the Supreme Court had previ-
ously announced on many occasions that good business reasons will not justify per se
violations of the antitrust laws, see, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 220 (1940) (holding that "the elimination of so-called competitive evils is no
legal justification for [anticompetitive] buying programs"); National Soc'y of Prof'l
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-95 (1978) (recognizing that safety concerns
brought on by fears of competitive bidding are not sufficient to prohibit such bidding in
the face of the Sherman Act), the Ninth Circuit directly entertained Kodak's arguments
of business justification. See Kodak, 903 F.2d at 618-19. The Supreme Court referred to
those arguments indirectly, but without criticizing the Ninth Circuit for having heard
them. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2078-79. The suggestion that such justification may be well-
received by the Court undercuts the concept of per se illegality and casts doubt on the
continued vitality of the per se rule against tying arrangements.
7. See infra notes 130-131 and accompanying text; see also infra note 139 (arguing
that Kodak does not reject arguments based upon economic theory, but counters one
theoretical argument with another).
8. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2089-90. Kodak controlled almost 100% of the parts
market and at least 80% of the service market, thus providing Kodak with the power to
exclude competition or control prices. Id.
9. See, e.g., Neal Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Kodak: A Barrier Against Naked Economic
Theory, N.Y. LJ., June 16, 1992, at 3; Jonathan Jacobson, Kodak: Daguerreotype or Laser
Projection?, N.Y. L.J., July 30, 1992, at 5.
10. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
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future antitrust cases." The implications of this change are mo-
mentous: after Kodak, every company, no matter how small, may be
subject to the heightened form of antitrust scrutiny previously re-
served exclusively for firms with a high share of the relevant market.
This Article will analyze the quiet revolution worked by the Ko-
dak case. In particular, Part I will discuss the central and pervasive
role that antitrust doctrine ascribes to market power analysis. Part
II will examine briefly the phenomenon of imperfect information,
describe some of its more common causes, and set forth some of the
difficulties inherent in any judicial effort to remedy market failures
on a case-by-case basis. Part III will review the role assigned by the
Kodak Court to informational failures in the determination of market
power and will explore the implications of this new role-and that
of other forms of market failure-for antitrust theory and practice.
Finally, Part IV will propose a solution for limiting the doctrinal and
commercial harm that Kodak could cause, a solution made impera-
tive by the need to constrain the far-reaching implications of Kodak
discussed in Part III.
I. THE CRITICAL ROLE OF MARKET POWER IN ANTITRUST LAW
Market power is the focal point of antitrust law. All the major
antitrust statutes concentrate on either preventing its formation or
prohibiting its misuse.' 2 The legality of attempts to monopolize,
form joint ventures and effect corporate mergers depends in each
case upon whether those activities would be likely to create market
power for the participants.' 3 A firm with market power is held to a
higher standard of business conduct than one without it; such a firm
11. Kodak is limited by its terms to "difficult and costly" information gaps and
"switching costs" in markets for "complex durable goods" only. However, the rationale
of Kodak's new approach to determining market power extends logically and easily to
other types of market imperfections in other kinds of markets. See infra notes 141-153
and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1988) (declaring combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade illegal, and making it a felony to monopolize or attempt to
monopolize trade); Clayton Act §§ 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1988) (making it unlawful
to sell goods on the condition that the buyer refrain from dealing with a competitor,
where the effect would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly, or
to buy the stock of a competitor where it would have the same effect); FTC Act § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1988) (declaring unfair methods of competition unlawful).
13. See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 298-99 (8th Cir. 1976)
(holding that the prospect of attaining market power is critical to a determination of the
"dangerous probability of success," an element of the attempted monopolization of-
fense), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); see also United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964) (evaluating the legality of a proposed merger by reference to
post-merger market power).
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is obliged, under certain circumstances, to share the source of its
power with rivals1 4 and is required, under other circumstances, to
continue cooperating with competitors when it might prefer to do
otherwise.' 5 All cases judged under the "rule of reason" standard-
the increasingly dominant decisional paradigm 6 -consider market
power a highly relevant factor, and certain legally suspect contrac-
tual arrangements, such as "tie-ins," are unlawful per se only if the
seller has market power in the tying product.
17
The concept of market power has a uniform meaning through-
out antitrust jurisprudence. When courts discuss the kind or
amount of market power necessary to define a "monopolist,"' 8 for
example, they are implicitly describing the same sort of "market
power" used to decide tie-in cases, group boycotts,' 9 and all the
14. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-80 (1973) (holding
that the refusal to permit a municipality access to an electric power grid when such ac-
cess was necessary for independent power generation was a violation of the Sherman
Act).
15. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600-05
(1985) (holding that the termination of participation in a multi-area lift ticket by a mo-
nopolist solely for exclusionary reasons violated the Sherman Act).
16. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-
04 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979);
National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); Piraino, supra
note 6, at 686 ("[I]n the past ten years, the per se rule has been applied less frequently,
and the rule of reason has achieved a dominant role in antitrust analysis.").
17. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984).
18. According to the Supreme Court, "market power" is a necessary, but not a suffi-
cient, precondition to the possession of "monopoly power." In Kodak, for example, the
Court recited the axiom that "[mionopoly power under § 2 requires, of course, some-
thing greater than market power under § 1." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992). Traditionally, firms have converted market power
to monopoly power by willfully acquiring or maintaining the former or by engaging in
some type of impermissible exclusionary conduct. See, e.g., Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at
112 (holding that control over an entire market for college football television broadcasts
constituted a monopoly); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)
(holding that possession of 87% of the relevant market share and willfully maintaining
such a share constituted a monopoly); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 797 (1946) (holding that a conspiracy to control the interstate tobacco market with
intent to exclude competitors constituted a monopoly offense).
19. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 298 (1985) (holding that a plaintiff challenging expulsion from a group buying
cooperative must show that "the cooperative possesses market power or unique access
to a business element necessary for effective competition," in order to satisfy the per se
test of illegality); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986)
(holding that the per se approach in group boycott cases "has generally been limited to
cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to dis-
courage them from doing business with a competitor").
"Group boycotts," also known as "concerted refusals to deal," generally involve
"joint efforts by a firm or firms to disadvantage competitors by 'either directly denying
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other antitrust offenses in which market power is a necessary ele-
ment.2 ° Courts are also describing, or at least they had described
before Kodak, a concept applicable to all markets, without exception.
Any change in the judicial definition of market power for one pur-
pose, or for one type of offense, would therefore reverberate
throughout antitrust law, altering that crucial definition for almost
all purposes, in all markets and for all offenses that involve the mar-
ket power concept.
Despite its importance to antitrust law, the notion of "market
power" lacks a precise judicial definition. The Supreme Court has
described the term variously as the "power to set higher than com-
petitive prices,,, 2 ' "the ability to raise prices above those that would
be charged in a competitive market,"'22 and "the power to control
prices or exclude competition. '2  Obviously, these definitions are
not mutually consistent. Additionally, each contains problems of
measurement that make its application by a trial court highly prob-
lematic.24 These problems, among others, have spawned scholarly
demands that courts employ a more economically precise definition
or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny relationships the competitors
need in the competitive struggle.' " Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294 (cita-
tions omitted).
20. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly acknowledged that the same
notion of market power applies throughout antitrust, it has acted in a manner consistent
with that premise. When discussing "market power" in the tying context, for example,
the Supreme Court regularly quotes, and specifically relies upon, definitions of market
power taken from cases dealing with monopolization. See, e.g., Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2080-
81 (quoting and citing, in its discussion of the traditional definition of market power,
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 571, and United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391 (1956), both monopolization cases).
21. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590 (1986).
22. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38.
23. E.L du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391. Strictly speaking, this is not a definition
of market power, but of monopoly power. Economists generally consider the terms to
be synonymous. See Richard Schmalensee, Comment, Another Look at Market Power, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1789 n. 1 (1982). Some antitrust scholars have argued persuasively
that antitrust courts have used, and should use, the terms "market power" and "monop-
oly power" interchangeably. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompe-
titive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 219 (1986)
(arguing that antitrust opinions that facially state distinct general standards for each
practice actually "express concern with an identical, underlying antitrust policy issue:
the undue, unfair, or anticompetitive exclusion of rivals by their competitors").
24. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases,
94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939-52 (1981). The measurement problems include, for example,
assessing the "competitive price" by extrapolating from the price levels in an actual
market to those in a hypothetically "competitive" one; determining how much price dis-
persion, if any, can exist before the market seems uncompetitive; and defining with some
specificity terms such as "control" of price and "exclusion" of competition. Id.
1993]
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of market power,25 and have helped to explain the adoption by most
courts of the use of "market share" as a practical, shorthand method
for measuring market power.
The use of market share as a proxy for market power dates back
at least as far as Judge Learned Hand's famous opinion in the Alcoa
Case.26 The particulars of market share methodology have changed
very little over the years.27 As Professors Landes and Posner have
stated, "[t]he standard method of proving market power in antitrust
cases involves first defining a relevant [product and geographic]
market in which to compute the defendant's market share, next
computing that share, and then deciding whether it is large enough
to support an inference of the required degree of market power. '"28
This methodology, however, may be problematic. High market
share may overstate true market power, while low market share may
understate it.29 Other factors ignored by conventional market share
analysis, such as ease or difficulty of entry into the market, persist-
ently high profits, and the presence in the market of unused capac-
ity, can often help present a more precise picture of true market
power."0 Accordingly, some federal courts have chosen to modify
their techniques for assessing market power by permitting, for ex-
ample, evidence of the absence of entry barriers to a particular mar-
ket to offset a defendant's high market share."' The Supreme Court
25. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 23, at 253-66; Landes & Posner, supra note
24, at 976-82.
26. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (hold-
ing that a firm with more than 90% market share has a monopoly, a firm with less than
33% does not, and a firm with 60% or 64% is "doubtful").
27. Although the Supreme Court has never expressly ratified the market share crite-
ria adopted by Judge Hand in the Alcoa Case, in no case prior to Kodak had the Court
found "market power" in a firm with a market share of less than 50%. Some lower
federal courts have expressly allowed other factors-such as the strength of consumer
demand, the absence of effective barriers to entry, or the apparent vigor of interbrand
competition-some weight in market power analysis. See, e.g., Broadway Delivery Corp.
v. United Parcel Serv., 651 F.2d 122, 127-30 (2d Cir.) (suggesting that a firm with low
market share may possess monopoly power), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981); Forro
Precision, Inc. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
1982) (leaving open the possibility that a firm with a market share of 35% may have
market power, if adequate evidence of the existence of other factors is introduced).
Before Kodak, however, the Supreme Court had never considered factors other than
market share when assessing a firm's market power.
28. Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 938.
29. See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 507 (1978).
30. For a full discussion of the shortcomings of the market share proxy as an accu-
rate index of market power, see generally Schmalensee, supra note 23.
31. See Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir.
1986) (finding that Blue Cross and Blue Shield (the "Blues") had no power in the mar-
ket for health insurance, regardless of their market share, because "[n]ew firms may
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has never adopted or approved any of these modifications.
As proxy measures go, market share has proved both durable
and useful. For almost fifty years it has remained the keystone of
market power analysis, virtually unaltered by the Supreme Court,
even while the Court was extending market power analysis to new
areas of antitrust law. When the Court declared in 1984 that "mar-
ket power" in the tying product was necessary to make a tying ar-
rangement unlawful per se,3 2 the Court applied its traditional test of
market power-the market share proxy-in what was then a new
context. The following year, when it added a market power require-
ment to the per se version of the group boycott offense, the Court
used the term "market power" without defining or describing it at
all,33 apparently convinced that the meaning of "market power" was
so well understood that it needed no further elaboration.
The Supreme Court has remained particularly faithful to the
market share proxy. For the past forty years,3 4 the Court has con-
sistently repeated the rule-although occasionally altering its pre-
cise wording-that the existence of market power "ordinarily may
be inferred from the predominant share of the market."'35 While the
Court has consistently suggested by its use of the word "ordinarily"
that the market share proxy was theoretically subject to some set of
limiting circumstances, prior to Kodak it had never either intimated
what those circumstances might be or applied a standard for ascer-
enter easily [since] insurers need only a license and capital ... [and t]he Blues do not
own any assets that block or delay entry"); see also Indiana Grocery v. Super Valu Stores,
864 F.2d 1409, 1414 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that high market share translates to market
power "only when sales reflect control of the productive assets in the business, for only
then does it reflect an ability to curtail total market output"); Ocean State Physicians
Health Plan v. Blue Cross, 692 F. Supp. 52, 69 (D.R.I. 1988) ("In a regulated industry,
such as health care insurance, a heavy reliance on market share statistics probably would
be an inaccurate or misleading indication of monopoly power."), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1101
(1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990).
Commentators who recognize that other economic factors may counterbalance the
presumptive power of firms with high market share argue nevertheless that firms with
small market share ("below 50 or 60 percent") should enjoy a presumption of
powerlessness. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 518.3c
(Supp. 1991).
32. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-27 (1984).
33. Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 296-98 (1985).
34. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992);Jeffer-
son Parish Hosp. Dist., 466 U.S. at 2; Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495 (1969); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
35. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571.
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taining market power that actually differed from a strict market
share approach. For the Supreme Court, market share had become
the functional equivalent of market power.
The durability of the market share proxy stems in part from the
practical benefits that it confers on antitrust courts and prospective
antitrust defendants. While a firm may be unable to determine its
marginal CoSt,3 6 or the pertinent elasticities of demand and sup-
ply,37 it can readily identify its competitors and gauge, with a rea-
sonable degree of accuracy, its share of the relevant product market.
The relative ease with which firms can estimate their own degree of
market share-and hence market power-doubtless enables firms to
estimate their risk of being subjected to the stricter scrutiny im-
posed on firms with high market share, and diminishes the prospect
of costly and time-consuming antitrust litigation. Similarly, the
availability of the market share surrogate provides courts with a
workable methodology in an area that otherwise could be extremely
complicated. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why the
market share proxy has endured so long in its traditional form.
Because the concept of "market power" has had a consistent
meaning for all companies, in all markets, and for all antitrust viola-
tions, a change in the methodology for determining its possession
would effectively restructure most of antitrust law. Until Kodak, the
Supreme Court had been understandably reluctant to engage in that
kind of restructuring.
II. PERFECT COMPETITION, MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND
INFORMATION GAPS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
In Kodak, the Supreme Court rejected the market share proxy in
favor of an analysis that recognizes the monopoly-like power that
can accrue to firms with a small market share in markets made im-
perfect by the presence of "difficult and costly" information gaps
36. "Marginal cost" represents the "extra or additional cost of producing another
unit of output." PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 463 (12th
ed. 1985). In economic terms, "market power" is simply the ability to set price above
marginal cost. See Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 939 ("Under perfect competition,
price equals marginal cost, so if a firm's price is above its marginal cost, the implication
is that . . . it has at least some market power.").
37. Elasticity of demand, also called price elasticity of demand, measures the "de-
gree to which quantity [of a product] demanded by buyers responds to a price change"
in that good. Elasticity of supply, also referred to as price elasticity of supply, measures
the "percentage change in quantity supplied divided by the percentage change in price"
or, in other words, the responsiveness of suppliers to an increase in price. SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS, supra note 36, at 912. Elasticities of demand and supply are relevant to the
determination of "market power." See Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 939-44.
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and "very high" switching costs. 38 Information gaps and switching
costs are two species of what economists generally refer to as a
"market failure," which may arise from any "imperfection in the
price system that prevents an efficient allocation of resources. ' ' 39
Because Kodak's new analytical paradigm explicitly recognizes that
the existence in a market of certain informational imperfections can
make small firms in that market "powerful" in the antitrust sense, a
brief discussion of market imperfection is in order.
Perfect competition-that is, the absence of market failure-is
easily defined. Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, authors of a
well-known university textbook on economics,a ° define it generally
as the presence in a market for a particular good of "a sufficient
number of firms or degree of rivalry such that no one firm can affect
the price of that good."'" Other definitions of perfect competition,
offered by law professors or policy analysts, differ slightly in their
wording but are similar in substance.4 2 Perfectly competitive mar-
kets demonstrate the following four characteristics: (1) perfect
product homogeneity; (2) large numbers of buyers and sellers; (3)
perfect knowledge of market conditions by all market participants;
and (4) the complete mobility of all productive resources. 4s
Despite the ease with which economists and law professors can
describe the theory of perfect competition and its necessary precon-
ditions, they are hard-pressed to identify any market that is actually
either perfectly competitive or perfectly demonstrative of even one
of the four preconditions of perfect markets. Almost every real mar-
ket contains some product heterogeneity, 4 lacks sufficiently large
38. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2085, 2087
(1992).
39. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 36, at 909.
40. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 36.
41. Id. at 47. George Stigler, the father of modern price theory, defined perfect com-
petition as that state of the market "in which the individual buyer or seller does not
influence the price by his purchases or sales"; in other words, a market in which "the
elasticity of supply facing any buyer is infinite, and the elasticity of demand facing any
seller is infinite." GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 87 (3d ed. 1966).
42. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-2
(1985) ("A competitive market is one in which 1) every good is priced at the cost of
producing it, giving the producers and sellers only enough profit to maintain investment
in the industry; and 2) every person willing to pay this price will be able to buy it.");
DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY ANALYSIS, CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 264
(2d ed. 1992) ("In an efficient market the equilibrium price equals the marginal social
cost of production.").
43. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, at 2; STIGLER, supra note 41, at 88.
44. In most markets, sellers attempt to distinguish their products from those of their
competitors, either by actually making them different or by making claims that they are
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numbers of buyers or sellers, displays significant gaps of informa-
tion, and places some brake on the mobility of resources. 45 These
flaws, of course, are not the only barriers to perfectly functioning
markets. Antitrust law has historically focused on market imperfec-
tions that have been created by the unlawful acquisition or abuse of
monopoly power and by the conspiratorial activity of competitors.46
These barriers to perfect competition are, in an important sense,
produced by market participants, not by the workings of the market
itself, and for that reason are analytically distinguishable from struc-
tural "market failures."
In particular, imperfect information is a market failure because
inadequate, incorrect, or incomplete product information will pre-
vent consumers from obtaining perfect knowledge about that mar-
ket, causing the market to move further away from the competitive
ideal.47 The failure of a market to generate perfect information
might seem counterintuitive: sellers and buyers have strong eco-
nomic incentives respectively to disseminate and to gather informa-
tion, and theory suggests that if the production of information were
costless to sellers, disclosure would be virtually complete.48 All
markets, however, demonstrate information gaps, for a broad range
of reasons.
Gaps in consumer information can arise because the production
of complete product information is expensive. Often, a company
choosing to produce that information, in spite of its cost, will be
unable to realize the full value of its efforts.49 So-called "public
good" properties5" of information often deter its production and
unique. The presence of these real and claimed differences between products in the
same market complicates the task of comparison for consumers, makes price a less relia-
ble indicator of value, and occasionally creates enough demand for a particular product
to allow it to command a premium above the market price. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS,
supra note 36, at 508-11, 536-38.
45. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 42, at 14.
46. See, e.g., infra notes 70-71.
47. See, e.g., Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24
J.L. & EcON. 491, 492 (1981) (noting that without sufficient information about price,
quality and other relevant product attributes, "the incentive to compete on price and
quality will be weakened, and consumer welfare will be reduced").
48. Id. at 502. For buyers, the increase in real income resulting from increased effi-
ciency in purchase decisions is a strong economic incentive to obtain product informa-
tion. On the part of sellers, the economic gain from disclosing information which
distinguishes their product and makes it a more attractive purchase decision is obvious.
Id.
49. See id. at 502-04.
50. Economists define a "public good" as one "whose benefits may be provided to
all people .. .at no more cost than that required to provide it to one person. The
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dissemination by private parties;51 once released, information com-
piled by one firm can be appropriated by others who have contrib-
uted nothing to its production, who sometimes pay nothing for its
use, and who can frequently re-use or resell the information, with-
out diminishing its value. Consequently, would-be producers of in-
formation cannot usually capture its full value for themselves, and
will be dissuaded from producing all the information necessary to
the effective functioning of their market. The underproduction of
information can thus represent a rational response by sellers to
structural market flaws that they cannot correct individually.5"
Obviously, not all information gaps are structural. Sellers can
create some informational problems and exacerbate others that they
did not create. For example, in the short run, spreading false infor-
mation about one's product, or withholding negative information
about it, can be distinctly profitable, as can issuing misinformation
about the products of one's competitors. Sellers possessed of mar-
ket power in a particular product market may have incentives to mis-
use, or create, imperfect information.53 For their part, consumers
may fail to gather adequate product information or to evaluate ra-
tionally that which they do acquire.54
From a causal perspective, information gaps can arise from one
or more of three sources: individual sellers can intentionally initiate
them,55 buyers can create them through ignorance or neglect, or the
market may generate them structurally, without "fault" on the part
of either sellers or buyers. Two or three of these sources can com-
bine in some proportion to jointly produce imperfect information.
Recent academic literature about the legal implications of imperfect
information has assiduously avoided any discussion of the causation
problem56 for several reasons: imperfect information, however
benefits of the good are indivisible and people cannot be excluded." SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS, supra note 36, at 913.
51. Id. at 48-49, 713-15.
52. Id.
53. See Beales et al., supra note 47, at 507. See generally Steven Salop, The Noisy Monop-
olist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion, and Price Discrimination, 44 REV. ECON. STUD.
393 (1977) (arguing that sellers exploit differences in levels of consumer information to
maximize gain from poorly informed consumers).
54. See Beales et al., supra note 47, at 506.
55. Any conspiracy by sellers to restrict the flow of relevant product information
would, of course, violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988) ("Every ... conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce .. .is declared to be
illegal.").
56. See generally Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Con-
sumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REV. 661 (1982) (not discussing the causation problems
of imperfect information); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the
1993] 347
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
caused, is a market-wide problem; its cause may be structural in na-
ture; and it may be impossible to allocate responsibility for jointly
caused imperfections.
Additionally, recent commentaries have been openly skeptical
of the extent to which any methodology can accurately measure the
anticompetitive effects of imperfect information in a particular mar-
ket.57 This skepticism derives from the fact that in most markets,
and especially in competitive ones, buyers and sellers have strong
incentives to close information gaps on their own. These incentives
may fail, however, when buyers and sellers either affirmatively de-
sire the particular information gaps,58 or recognize that the cost of
eliminating the imperfections exceeds the harm done to the market
by their continued existence.59 Consequently, causation problems
and the attendant difficulties of measurement have led commenta-
tors to conclude that information failures require the kind of
market-wide, regulatory solutions that courts are institutionally in-
capable of fashioning.60
III. THE KODAK DECISION: MARKET POWER REDEFINED
If Kodak had done no more than replace the market share proxy
for market power with some new test, its impact on antitrust law
would have been considerable. But by basing its new test on the
presence of informational imperfections in the relevant market, the
Court has married antitrust jurisprudence to the field of information
economics, called by one commentator "the most confusing branch
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979)
(not discussing causation).
57. See Craswell, supra note 56, at 688 (suggesting that a distinction between procom-
petitive and anticompetitive tie-ins on the basis of an empirically-grounded cost-benefit
analysis is "so difficult and so subjective" that it would "rarely if ever yield unequivocal
conclusions"); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 56, at 660-62 (discussing difficulties inher-
ent in attempts to determine when market price has become significantly distorted from
that which would prevail in a hypothetically perfectly informed market).
58. See Craswell, supra note 56, at 686-89 (explaining how buyers and sellers use
imperfect information as a means of allocating risk).
59. See id. at 689-90.
60. See id. at 700 (commenting that in the context of tying arrangements, assessment
of the kind of market failure caused by imperfect information "requires evidence not
usually gathered in antitrust cases . . . [and] if an information imperfection is found to
exist, the best remedy ... may not even be available under the antitrust laws"); see also
Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 56, at 678 (arguing that "courts should play a more limited
role in responding to information problems than they do at present" and applauding




of the dismal science,"61 with its attendant problems of measure-
ment and remedy. This marriage threatens to disrupt thoroughly
the course of antitrust law, burdening the lower courts with a slew of
difficult problems, and hopelessly confusing the business commu-
nity about the boundaries of antitrust enforcement.
A. The Decision Itself
In addition to its well-known lines of photographic equipment
and film, the Eastman Kodak Company makes and sells high-volume
photocopier and micrographics equipment. 62 Replacement parts
for this equipment are manufactured either by Kodak itself or to its
specifications by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and are
the only parts compatible with Kodak equipment.63 Eastman Kodak
sells post-warranty service for the equipment separately, either
through annual service contracts, which include all necessary parts,
or on a per-call basis.6 '
Beginning in the early 1980s, a number of independent service
organizations (ISOs) began to service Kodak equipment using parts
purchased primarily from OEMs, but also using parts purchased
from Kodak itself, from existing Kodak customers, or from parts
brokers.65 By the mid-1980s, the ISOs had made substantial in-
roads into Kodak's share of the service market for Kodak equip-
ment.66 This development prompted Kodak to initiate a policy of
selling replacement parts for its equipment only to buyers who
agreed to use Kodak service exclusively or to repair their own ma-
chines.67 In conjunction with this policy, Kodak tried to limit the
ISOs' access to other sources of Kodak parts. It agreed with the
OEMs that they would sell Kodak parts only to Kodak, pressured
parts brokers and Kodak equipment owners not to sell parts to ISOs
and attempted to restrict the availability of used Kodak machines.6"
These measures succeeded in drying up the ISOs' sources of Kodak
parts, compelling their customers to switch to Kodak for service,
thereby forcing many ISOs out of business and causing others to
61. Beales et al., supra note 47, at 503.
62. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2077 (1992).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Parts brokers acquired Kodak parts either by purchasing them directly from
Eastman Kodak or by stripping them from used Kodak equipment. Id. at 2077 n.2.
66. Id. at 2077.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2078.
1993] 349
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
lose substantial revenues. 6 9
The measures also prompted the ISOs to accuse Eastman Ko-
dak of violating the antitrust laws. In 1987, they brought suit, alleg-
ing that Kodak had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act 7° by
unlawfully tying the sale of service for Kodak machines to the sale of
parts, and that Kodak had violated section 2 of the Act 7' by unlaw-
fully monopolizing and attempting to monopolize the service mar-
ket for Kodak copying and micrographic machinery.72 After only
limited discovery and without a hearing, the trial court granted Ko-
dak's motion for summary judgment. 73 Finding no evidence that
Kodak had tied the sale of service or parts to the sale of its equip-
ment-but overlooking, in the process, the alleged tie between parts
and service-the court concluded that while Kodak may have had a
"natural monopoly" in the market for Kodak brand parts, its unilat-
eral refusal to sell those parts to the ISOs did not violate Section
2.7
4
By a divided vote, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed.75 With regard to the Section 2 claims, the court deter-
mined that the ISOs had offered evidence sufficient to create an is-
sue of fact as to whether Kodak's restrictive parts policy was
"anticompetitive" and "exclusionary" and involved "a specific in-
tent to monopolize." 76 As to the tying claim, the appellate court
found that parts and service were two separate products that could
69. Id.
70. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1988).
71. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. 11 1990) (increasing fines for viola-
tion to $10,000,000 and $350,000 for corporations and other persons, respectively).
72. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2078.
73. Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 1989-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,402 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2072
(1992).
74. Id.
75. Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990),
aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
76. Id. at 620.
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be tied to each other.7 7 The ISOs, according to the Ninth Circuit,
had produced enough evidence to indicate that Kodak had in fact
tied service to parts and that a factual issue existed as to whether
Kodak had the requisite market power in parts-the tying product-
to force or induce some of its customers to purchase Kodak-offered
service-the tied product-that they would not otherwise buy.78
The court rejected Kodak's purported business justifications as
either pretextual or illogical, and remanded the case for trial.79
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kodak hinged entirely upon the
determination that Eastman Kodak could arguably possess power in
the after-market for its own parts. Because it was conceded on ap-
peal that the interbrand markets for Kodak's equipment were com-
petitive, a° Kodak relied on neoclassical economic theory to argue
that it could not possibly have power in the after-market for its own
parts.8 ' Kodak claimed that if it attempted to exercise its purported
power in the parts market by raising prices, rational equipment buy-
ers would regard the rise in the price of parts as an increase in the
overall price of the equipment.8 2 Because the interbrand equip-
ment markets were concededly competitive, any increase in the
overall price of Kodak's product would lead inevitably to lost sales,
not to increased revenues. For that reason, Kodak contended, it
could exercise no real power over buyers of its parts.83 Without
power in the market for its own parts, Kodak would be legally inca-
pable of committing any of the antitrust violations alleged by the
ISOs.84
The Ninth Circuit recognized the theoretical force of Kodak's
77. Id. at 615-16.
78. See id. at 616.
79. See id. at 618, 620-2 1. Judge Wallace dissented. While he agreed that Kodak's
business practices might constitute a tying arrangement, he argued that because the in-
terbrand market for copiers was concededly competitive, Eastman Kodak could not have
any power in the market for its own replacement parts. Id. at 621 (Wallace, J., dissent-
ing). The majority was wrong, he argued, to reject Kodak's argument as too theoretical:
"power in the primary interbrand market is a prerequisite to power in the derivative
market for replacement parts." Id. at 623 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 616 n.3 ("Appellants do not dispute Kodak's assertion that it lacks market
power in the interbrand markets.").
81. For a broad introduction to neoclassical economic theory, see STIGLER, supra
note 41.





argument but rejected it nevertheless.8 5 Instead, the court accepted
the contention of the ISOs that the interbrand equipment market in
which Eastman Kodak operated did not function as price theory
would predict, because it contained certain "imperfections" that al-
lowed Kodak to exert in fact the kind of monopoly power that was
theoretically unavailable to it.8 6 The court asserted that "[m]arket
imperfections can keep economic theories about how consumers
will act from mirroring reality."87
To the Ninth Circuit, moreover, it was legally irrelevant that the
ISOs had neither conducted any market analysis nor specified any
particular "imperfections" in the interbrand markets for equip-
ment."8 Rather, it sufficed that the ISOs had presented evidence of
"actual events" from which a trier of fact could conclude that Kodak
had power in the interbrand equipment market.8 9 Consequently,
the court concluded that power in the interbrand equipment market
was not the sole basis for power in the intrabrand parts market;
"[s]ome strength in the interbrand market, although short of actual
market power, can combine with other factors to yield power in an
after-market."'
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, in part to determine
whether Kodak's lack of market power in service and parts "must be
assumed when such power is absent in the equipment market."9 '
85. Id. at 617 (explaining that "Kodak's desire to attract new customers might...
keep it from charging supercompetitive prices for service" but finding the record "not
fully developed on this issue").
86. Id. It appears from the opinion of the Ninth Circuit that the ISOs first raised the
issue of imperfections in the copier and micrographic markets during the course of argu-
ing that the district court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. Id. at 616.
87. Id. at 617.
88. Id. According to the court, to require plaintiffs to present such evidence "would
elevate theory above reality." Id.
89. Id. There was evidence of three "actual events": Kodak had allegedly charged
higher prices than the ISOs for service of allegedly inferior quality; competition from
ISOs sometimes forced down the price that Kodak charged for service; and rather than
switch to competitors' systems, some owners of "large Kodak equipment packages" paid
"higher prices" for Kodak service. Id.
90. Id. at 618. The court failed to elaborate on how much "strength" was needed,
how far "short" of actual market power that strength could be, what "other factors"
might be relevant, and how that "strength" and those "other factors" could combine to
yield power in the after-market.
91. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1992).
More precisely, this is the majority's characterization of one of the issues raised by Ko-
dak. In its petition for certiorari, Eastman Kodak raised three questions:
1. Does a vertically integrated equipment manufacturer that lacks market
power in fiercely competitive interbrand equipment markets violate the Sher-
man Act by declining to sell replacement parts to ISOs? 2. Can respondents
properly base their per se tying claim on the alleged tying of two single brand
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Because no other court of appeals had allowed after-market power
to be inferred in the absence of primary market power, 92 and be-
cause the Supreme Court had explicitly rejected, just eight years
earlier, an argument that it should consider informational imperfec-
tions in its market power analysis,9" one might have confidently pre-
dicted a reversal of the Ninth Circuit's decision. Affirmance of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion would effectively substitute a cumbersome,
fact-specific methodology for the more theoretical analysis that had
characterized the Court's recent antitrust decisions, thereby signifi-
cantly expanding the number and complexity of antitrust trials and
markedly reducing the utility of summary judgment at a time when
the Court seemed to be moving in the opposite direction.94
Remarkably, the Supreme Court affirmed. 95 Like the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the Court rejected Kodak's argument that, in a competitive
market for equipment, a seller's higher service prices lead directly to
lost equipment sales, and hence to a decrease in its revenues. 96 Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for the Court, found the theory "intuitively
appealing, ' 97 but discounted it because such a theory "may not ac-
curately explain the behavior of the primary and derivative markets
for complex durable goods."98 The possible existence in those mar-
kets of significant information gaps and switching costs "foil[s] the
simple assumption" that the equipment and service markets act as
perfect complements to one another.99
In particular, the Court noted that from the consumers' per-
spective, "lifecycle pricing" of complex, durable equipment is com-
aftermarkets (tying Kodak service to Kodak parts) which are wholly derivative
of competitive interbrand markets? 3. Does speculation about unspecified mar-
ket imperfections constitute the "more persuasive evidence" required under
Matsushita to defeat summary judgment in an economically implausible anti-
trust case?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 111 S.
Ct. 2823 (1991) (No. 90-1029).
92. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2100 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984) (finding
informational imperfections too "abstract" a factor to "generate the kind of market
power that justifies condemnation of tying"). For a fuller discussion of the treatment
accorded the market imperfection issue by the Court in Jefferson Parish, see infra notes
112-116 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
95. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2092.
96. Id. at 2081-82.
97. Id. at 2085.
98. Id. The Court emphasized that the actual conditions of Kodak's market refuted
its theoretical explanation; although Eastman Kodak had raised its prices for service, it




plicated and expensive.' 00 The information necessary for accurate
pricing decisions is difficult, if not impossible, to acquire, may
change during the life of the product, and is often customer-specific,
making it difficult for one buyer to anticipate her costs on the basis
of another's experience.' 0 ' The Court dismissed as a question of
fact Kodak's theoretically reasonable suggestion that, in a competi-
tive market, competitors will satisfy buyers' information needs about
rival products, 0 2 stating that even if consumers could overcome the
difficulties of lifecycle pricing, they "may choose not to do so," be-
cause acquiring that information is expensive. 10 3 In the Court's
view, the existence of these obstacles to accurate pricing informa-
tion constituted a significant market failure that defeated the as-
sumption that Kodak's equipment markets worked in a rational
manner.' 4 Without that assumption, it was conceivable that Kodak
could possess power in those markets despite having a low market
share. 1 0 5
The possible presence of a second form of market failure but-
tressed the Court's holding. Given the "heavy initial outlay" for Ko-
dak equipment, and the need to purchase support materials that
work only with Kodak equipment, current owners of Kodak equip-
ment could arguably incur "very high" costs if they chose to switch
to a competitor's product. 10 6 "Locked-in" to some extent by these
high "switching costs," Kodak's customers would presumably toler-
ate some significant level of increase in the price of service before
changing brands. 0 7 The Court reasoned that if the number of cus-
100. Id. at 2085. According to the Court, the lifecycle price of a piece of equipment is
the total cost to the buyer of owning that equipment over its useful life: the purchase
price plus the lifetime costs of replacement parts and service. In order to estimate accu-
rately the lifetime cost of owning such equipment, the consumer would need to know
"data on price, quality, and availability of products needed to operate, upgrade or en-
hance the initial equipment, as well as service and repair costs, including estimates of
breakdown frequency, nature of repairs, price of service and parts, length of 'down-time'
and losses incurred from down-time." Id.
101. Id. at 2086.
102. Id. The theory that consumers who search for information benefit those who do
not has been the subject of extended academic discussion. See, e.g., Michael Rothschild,
Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey, 81 J. POL. EcON. 1283
(1973); Steven Salop & Joseph Stiglitz, Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically
Competitive Price Dispersion, 44 REV. EcoN. STUD. 493, 494, 501 (1977).
103. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2086.
104. Id. at 2087 (reasoning that because of the informational imperfection, "it makes
little sense to assume, in the absence of any evidentiary support, the equipment-
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tomers "locked-in" was large compared to the number of potential
new consumers, Kodak could raise the price of service just as if it
were a monopolist.' 08 The possible existence of "very high" switch-
ing costs, coupled with the chance that "locked-in" customers out-
numbered new ones, provided a second, independent reason for
disregarding the theory of rational markets and viewing Kodak as a
business that possessed "market power."' 0 9
In a narrow sense, Kodak holds that, in markets for complex du-
rable goods, market power analysis is not limited to the issue of
market share. Because information gaps may prevent facially com-
petitive markets from functioning competitively, even firms with
small market shares may be able to exert substantial power." t0 For
this reason, future antitrust defendants who move for summary
judgment on the basis of low market share are almost certain to
lose; practically all markets have information gaps comparable to
those described in Kodak. From now on, a plaintiff's argument that
the market functions imperfectly-because of information costs or
switching costs or both-will invariably compel a full-fledged anti-
trust trial that deals first with the alleged competitive failures of the
particular market and then with the defendant's alleged antitrust
violations.
B. The Implications of Kodak
By explicitly permitting the existence of information gaps to af-
fect market power analysis, Kodak breaks sharply from prior antitrust
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2087-88 (concluding that, for summary judgment purposes, Kodak failed
to show that the ISOs' "inference of market power in the service and parts markets is
unreasonable").
110. In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, denounced
the majority's economic reasoning as "curious." Id. at 2096 (Scalia,J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Scalia argued that the Court's definition of market power "makes no economic
sense," id. at 2094 (ScaliaJ., dissenting), that its theoretical argument about the infor-
mation costs associated with the purchase of complicated goods was "a truism," id. at
2097 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and that the Court had never before suggested that such
"commonplace informational deficiencies" could confer market power in any sense rele-
vant to the antitrust laws. Id. at 2097-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Although correct to criticize the majority on these grounds, Justice Scalia failed to
acknowledge the implications of the Court's opinion for antitrust jurisprudence gener-
ally. In his view, the case concerned only the "per se rule condemning 'ties' " and the
standards governing "the behavior of would-be monopolists." Id. at 2092 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). No less than the majority opinion, the dissent ignored the consequences of
Kodak for other antitrust violations, the problems of definition and measurement that it
creates, the difficulty of containing its rationale, and the burdens that it places on poten-
tial defendants.
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doctrine in a number of significant ways. The implications of this
break are numerous and far-reaching. They range from relatively
simple problems of definition and measurement to complicated
questions about the role of causation in this new analysis. Lower
courts will be forced to ask whether the rationale of Kodak can logi-
cally be confined to markets for "complex durable goods" and to
imperfections of information; and as a practical matter, potential an-
titrust defendants will need to determine whether, and how, they
can adjust their business conduct, in light of Kodak, to protect them-
selves from antitrust liability.
1. A Dramatic Break From the Past.-Kodak marks a sharp depar-
ture from several significant and well-established aspects of antitrust
jurisprudence. Not only does it break from precedent, but it re-
places proven aspects of antitrust methodology with confusing tests
that will be difficult to apply. Furthermore, in conjunction with FTC
v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., "' also decided by the Court this past
term, Kodak represents a clear rejection of the contractionist ap-
proach to antitrust employed by the Supreme Court for the past fif-
teen years, and a strong signal that the Court has changed the terms
of discourse in antitrust jurisprudence.
Kodak is not the first Supreme Court opinion to consider
whether informational imperfections could create market power in a
firm whose market share was relatively small. In Jefferson Parish Hos-
pital District No. 2 v. Hyde, I 2 a case challenging the legality of an
alleged tying arrangement between hospital services and anesthesi-
ological services, the Court reversed a Fifth Circuit holding. 3 that
imperfections in local markets for health services, including a "lack
of complete information regarding the quality of medical care of-
fered,"1 4 warranted an inference of market power against a hospital
with only a thirty percent share of the relevant market. Despite ac-
knowledging both the existence of market imperfections and the
possibility that they might indirectly "impede competition on the
111. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992) (restricting the state action defense to alleged Sherman
Act violations by requiring that defendants prove that the state exercised independent
control over the economic policies involved in a regulatory scheme). See infra note 132
and accompanying text.
112. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
113. Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
466 U.S. 2 (1984).
114. Id. at 290. In addition to the lack of complete information about quality, the
Fifth Circuit relied on a second form of market imperfection, "the prevalence of third
party payment of bills," a factor that "eliminates a patient's incentive to compare the
relative cost effectiveness of competing hospitals." Id.
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merits,115 the Supreme Court held in Jefferson Parish that the "ab-
stract" form of market power generated by market imperfections
was not "the kind of market power that justifies condemnation of
tying."' 16
The approaches of Kodak and Jefferson Parish to the role of infor-
mational imperfections in market power analysis cannot be recon-
ciled. Even though both dealt with tying arrangements and the
markets in each presented consumers with substantial informational
difficulties, the Jefferson Parish Court directly declined to evaluate the
same kind of information gaps that, for the Kodak Court, conferred
"market power" on the defendant.
The opinion in Kodak failed to acknowledge the Court's depar-
ture from the rationale ofJefferson Parish.1 7 Nor did the Court artic-
ulate any basis for that departure or offer an explanation of how a
form of market power previously judged too "abstract" for antitrust
proscription had, in just eight years, become sufficiently concrete to
merit condemnation. The only arguable grounds for reconciling
the two opinions-that different markets deserve different antitrust
treatment, or that the information gaps in Kodak were more substan-
tial than those in Jefferson Parish-received no mention from the Ko-
dak Court.
Kodak also marks a break from the Supreme Court's historical
reluctance to apply complicated measurement techniques to eco-
nomic matters affecting antitrust cases." 18 The use of market share
as a proxy for market power developed at least in part because sev-
115. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15 n.24 (noting that "[e]specially where market imper-
fections exist, purchasers may not be fully sensitive to the price or quality implications of
a tying arrangement").
116. Id. at 27.
117. But see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2097-98
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have never suggested that the principal players in a
market with such commonplace informational deficiencies . . . exercise market power in
any sense relevant to the antitrust laws." (citing Jefferson Parish)).
118. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-95
(1956) (holding that although an appraisal of "cross-elasticity of demand" was needed
to determine the relevant product market, the difficulty of making that measurement
justified the use of the concept of "reasonable interchangeability"); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927) (noting the institutional dangers
inherent in attempts to find the "reasonable price [of a product] today"); United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898) (recognizing that judicial
attempts to determine whether, and to what extent, restraints of trade could serve the
public interest would constitute "set[ting] sail on a sea of doubt"), modified and aft'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899); see also A.A. Poultry Farms v. Rose Acre Farms, 881 F.2d 1396, 1400
(7th Cir. 1989) (describing various considerations making it difficult to infer predatory
conduct from the relation of price to cost).
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eral of the most relevant indicators of market power-such as the
relevant elasticities of demand and supply-could not be measured
accurately." 19 In part, the market share proxy has proved useful as a
surrogate test because a firm's market share can be fairly assessed-
not perfectly or with enough accuracy to satisfy all legitimate con-
cerns about market structure,' 20 but reasonably well and at a tolera-
ble administrative cost.
By making the presence of "difficult and costly" information
gaps potentially dispositive of the market power question, and likely
so at the summary judgment stage, the Court in Kodak has saddled
antitrust factfinders with measurement problems that may be insur-
mountable. Because only "difficult and costly" gaps-not every in-
formational imperfection-trigger the new market power analysis,
some method of measuring "difficulty" and "cost" seems essential
to a reasoned application of Kodak's holding. The Kodak Court,
however, suggested no such method. Nor did the Court attempt to
define either of those critical terms; it simply described the phenom-
enon of "lifecycle pricing" and labeled it "difficult and costly," with-
out distinguishing it on those bases from any other kind of
persistent information gap. 12 ' The task of developing some means
for assessing absolute and relative degrees of difficulty, and for as-
signing them a dollar value, will arguably embroil the lower courts
in measurement problems not previously addressed by antitrust
tribunals.
Kodak breaks from the conventional methodology of antitrust
jurisprudence in two other significant ways. The Supreme Court
has traditionally enforced the antitrust laws against firms that have
acted either to create or to worsen a competitive imbalance in their
markets. Courts have never found markets themselves to violate the
antitrust laws simply on account of their structure. To the contrary,
courts have refrained from proscribing the unilateral conduct of
firms in markets with structural imperfections when the only option
conceivably available for remedying the imperfection would be a
full-scale restructuring of the market.' 22
119. See Schmalensee, supra note 23, at 1796-97 (noting that the demand conditions
faced by a firm are "central to an assessment of its market power," but warning that
"firm demand curves are rarely observable").
120. See cases collected supra note 31.
121. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085-86.
122. See, e.g., In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8, 289 (1982) (Statement of Commissioner
Patricia P. Bailey) ("[Wihile there may be a legitimate concern about the anticompetitive
effects of the exercise of oligopoly power, it is rarely true that these concerns will man-
date an administrative agency decision to restructure an industry, short of a legislative
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The Court in Kodak effectively condemned Eastman Kodak for
"power" derived from structural information gaps that were not al-
leged to be its fault. Because Kodak's interbrand equipment mar-
kets exhibited "difficult and costly" informational imperfections-
but not because it created or exacerbated these imperfections-Ko-
dak was deemed capable of possessing "market power," notwith-
standing its utter inability to effect the market-wide solution
necessary to resolve those information problems.
Second, by its terms, Kodak apparently applies only to informa-
tion gaps in markets for "complex durable goods."' 2 3 While it does
not explicitly restrict its holding to such markets, Kodak clearly im-
plies, by its pointed reference to that particular kind of market, that
its rationale extends only to some product markets, and not to mar-
kets for personal services. However, the implications of a broader
reading-that Kodak's new market power analysis applies to all mar-
kets for goods and services-raise substantial problems of their
own. 1
24
No other antitrust court of modern vintage has distinguished
between different kinds of product markets or between product
markets and markets for personal services, either in determining
market power or in making any other critical antitrust determina-
tion. Since 1975, when the Court held in Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar' 25 that the "learned professions" were not exempt from anti-
trust scrutiny, 126 the Supreme Court has applied the same antitrust
law, the same methodology and the same type of analysis equally to
all kinds of product and service markets. 12 7 Kodak thus marks the
warrant to that effect."); ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON ANTITRUST 508 (1989) ("[W]here markets have evolved into oligopolies by inter-
nal growth or by mergers that went unchallenged or survived challenge in earlier days of
laissez faire[,] . . . no traditional antitrust challenge has been available.").
123. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 137-149.
125. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
126. Id. at 788 ("[Alnticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint on
commerce.").
127. In a footnote, the Court has suggested that the fact that a given restraint oper-
ates on a profession as distinguished from a business may change the analysis of whether
the restraint violates the Sherman Act. Id. at 788 n. 17 (noting that "[i]t would be unreal-
istic . . . automatically to apply to professions antitrust concepts which originated in
other areas" but cautioning that "[wie intimate no view on any other situation than the
one with which we are confronted today"). However, the Court has not yet applied a
different analysis to professionals. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447 (1986) (dentists); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982)




first recent opinion in which the Court has subjected firms in a par-
ticular product market to antitrust treatment more rigorous than the
norm.
Finally, along with FTC v. Ticor Insurance Co.,128 Kodak appar-
ently reverses the general direction of antitrust jurisprudence set by
the Court over the past fifteen years. During that time, almost with-
out exception, 29 the Court consistently contracted the scope ofju-
dicial involvement in antitrust enforcement, often relying on
economic theory to resolve disputed issues at the summary judg-
ment stage.' 3 0 While a complete discussion of the recent course of
antitrust jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, the "con-
tractionist" philosophy of the Court can be seen clearly from its de-
cisions in various areas of antitrust law.' 3 ' These decisions all point
128. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992) (re-examining the state-action immunity defense).
129. The lone exception seems to be Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (en banc), in which the Court established a new obligation
for monopolists: the duty not to change, without valid business justification, an estab-
lished course of cooperative dealing with a rival. See id. at 608-11. That duty is obvi-
ously a relatively narrow one in theory, and in practice lower federal courts have
interpreted Aspen Skiing Co. in a restrictive fashion as well. See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leas-
ing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (extending the
duty only to "circumstances where some cooperation is indispensable to effective com-
petition"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).
130. See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (relying significantly on
economic theory to distinguish interbrand from intrabrand competition). A number of
prominent commentators have urged that many categories of antitrust cases can, and
should, be decided on the basis of economic theory alone. See, e.g., Frank H. Easter-
brook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in
the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHi. L. REV. 6 (1981).
131. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) (restricting
the permissible limits of antitrust standing to parties who have suffered adverse eco-
nomic consequences as a direct result of the unlawful conduct); Business Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (narrowing the scope of per se rules against
resale price maintenance); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986) (concluding that, based on economic theory, an alleged scheme of predatory
pricing could not succeed and imposing a rigorous set of requirements for proof of
conspiracy in order to survive summary judgment); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.,
465 U.S. 752 (1986) (narrowing the scope of per se rules against resale price mainte-
nance); Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985) (imposing a requirement that market power be shown in order to sustain a
challenge to a group boycott as per se illegal); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (adding a showing of market power in the tying product to the
requirements for per se illegality of a tying arrangement); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n
of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (finding no per se violation in a requirement that group
members withhold x-rays from dental insurers, though it violated the Sherman Act
under the rule of reason standard); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Re-
gents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding that although a limitation on television coverage of
college football games violated the Sherman Act under the rule of reason standard, it
was not per se illegal); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1
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in the same direction: they limit or reduce the number of per se vio-
lations; they make proof of those violations more difficult for plain-
tiffs; and they turn summary judgment into a more effective remedy
for defendants.
Kodak and Ticor point in the opposite direction, especially Ko-
dak. Ticor weakens the state action defense, 3 2 thereby encouraging
more plaintiffs to proceed with their relatively narrow group of Sec-
tion 1 claims.' 33 Kodak expands the definition of "market power"-
a term critical to nearly every kind of antitrust claim-so broadly as
to enable almost any firm to possess it, generally increasing plain-
tiffs' likelihood of success and reducing drastically the utility of sum-
mary judgment to businesses caught up in antitrust litigation.
2. A Shift in the Terms of Debate.-Kodak may also signal a mean-
ingful shift in the terms of the debate over the future of antitrust
philosophy. Prior to Kodak, the Supreme Court's more controver-
sial antitrust opinions contained a relatively predictable majority
opinion and an equally predictable dissent.' 34 One side would ar-
gue in essence that, because of its fixed and measurable concern for
consumer welfare, neoclassical economic theory should control the
(1979) (holding that issuance of blanket licenses that permitted unlimited performance
of copyrighted compositions for a stated term did not constitute a per se unlawful price-
fixing offense under antitrust law).
132. The Supreme Court established the state action doctrine in Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), declaring that a state agricultural program was exempt from antitrust
liability, because Congress expressed no intent in the Sherman Act to "restrain state
action or official action directed by a state." Id. at 351. More recently, in California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), the Court
announced that private actors participating in a state-run or state-authorized program
could receive state action immunity when that program was "clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed as state policy" and the policy was " 'actively supervised' by the
State itself." Id. at 105 (citations omitted). In Ticor, the Court held that in order to
satisfy the "active supervision" requirement of Midcal, defendants need to prove that
"the State has played a substantial role in determining the specifics of the economic
policy." FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169, 2177 (1992). The new analysis
asks not whether there has been some state involvement in, or oversight of, the particu-
lar program, but seeks to determine whether the State "has exercised sufficient in-
dependent judgment and control" over that program. Id. These more exacting
standards obviously make proof of the defense more difficult.
133. Concurring in Ticor, Justice Scalia stated that while the Court's decision was
"faithful" to prior cases dealing with the "active supervision" prong of Midcal's test, it
would nevertheless be "a fertile source of uncertainty and (hence) litigation." Ticor, 112
S. Ct. at 2180 (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Busi-
ness Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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resolution of antitrust problems. 3 5 The other would contend that
social, political and equitable values offered more protection to the
core goals of antitrust policy: open access to markets, the encour-
agement of small business and the fair distribution of wealth.' 3 6 At
the same time, the academic literature addressing antitrust issues
witnessed a similar debate between the advocates of economic
theory and the champions of a more politically oriented philosophy
of competition. 137
Kodak could have fit this mold. The Court's economics wing
could have argued, as Justice Scalia did in dissent, that Kodak's
theoretical arguments were correct and should have controlled the
outcome of the case. 138 The sociopolitical wing could have con-
tended that Kodak's parts and service policy was effectively closing
the service market to small businesses and depriving them of a fair
opportunity to compete.
But no Justice in Kodak made the sociopolitical argument. The
debate took place solely on the level of economics, with the dissent
arguing for the primacy of theory and the majority claiming that the
facts of economic life were, in this case, more important than the
theory. 139 The absence of an advocate for the sociopolitical per-
135. See Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 731, 735 (using "economic analysis" to support the
decision).
136. See id. at 745-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (focusing on whether the alleged mis-
conduct created a "conflict with antitrust policy"). In Atlantic Richfield, for example, the
philosophical differences between the majority opinion and the dissent typified those
that had, until Kodak, characterized the Court's competing approaches to antitrust pol-
icy. Responding to the majority's use of economic theory to deny standing to a plaintiff
allegedly harmed by the defendant's vertical pricing policy, the dissent argued that
"[t]he Court, in its haste to excuse illegal behavior in the name of efficiency, has cast
aside a century of understanding that our antitrust laws are designed to safeguard more
than efficiency and consumer welfare." Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
137. The literature is extensive. For a representative sampling of the two schools,
compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) (advo-
cating economic theory) with John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the
Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Reso-
lution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125 (1987) (advocating a more social and
political approach); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1140 (1981); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content ofAntitrust, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 1051 (1979).
138. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2097-99
(1992) (Scalia,J., dissenting).
139. On a different level, the majority opinion actually could be interpreted as dis-
tinctly "theoretical." In its response to Kodak's reliance on price theory, the majority
may have been attempting to offer a different economic theory about the role of market
imperfections in disrupting the workings of hypothetically competitive markets. The
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spective may indicate that the Supreme Court has come unani-
mously to accept the notion that economic concerns drive
competition policy, but is unable to agree on which theories to apply
or on the extent to which economic theory should trump economic
fact. If so, the Court has undergone a major shift in philosophical
orientation, revealed for the first time by the opinion and dissent in
Kodak.
3. The Meaning of Kodakfor the Future of Antitrust.-Some of the
implications of Kodak for the future of antitrust jurisprudence
should be obvious from the previous discussion. Market power
analysis will be dramatically altered. The new analysis will present
lower courts with measurement problems that may be intractable.
The balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust
cases will shift decidedly in plaintiffs' direction.
There are other questions raised by Kodak, however, that may
not be so clear. The most important of these is whether lower
courts can limit Kodak, either to its own facts or to some reasonably
well-defined set of markets or circumstances; and if not, how far
they must logically extend Kodak's rationale. Almost as important is
the question of whether firms desirous of avoiding antitrust liability
can respond to Kodak in a legally useful fashion. If no useful re-
sponse seems possible, then all firms, no matter how small, must
live continuously under the threat of Kodak's market power analysis,
wondering if structural information gaps beyond their control will
confer "market power" upon them, subjecting them to heightened
antitrust scrutiny.' 40
a. Problems of Containment.-By its own terms, Kodak involved a
market for "complex durable goods. '" 4 ' In that kind of market, ac-
cording to the Court, consumers need to engage in "accurate life-
cycle pricing," a "difficult and costly" process.' 42 They must also
contend with "very high" "switching costs" that arise because Ko-
dak equipment, "though expensive when new, has little resale
value."' 4 3 In the Court's view, these costs "lock in" the Kodak con-
dissent in Kodak viewed the majority opinion in this light, referring to the majority's
position on information costs as a "theory of its own." Id. at 2097 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
140. Cf. Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 744 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (warning, in another
antitrust context, that any fundamental change in antitrust jurisprudence "can only
breed uncertainty in the law and confusion for businessmen").
141. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2077.
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sumers and, either separately or in conjunction with the information
gaps inherent in lifecycle pricing, ' 44 conceivably allow Eastman Ko-
dak to exert power in this market, despite its low market share.' 45
If Kodak's revolutionary approach to market power could be
confined rationally to markets for "complex durable goods," and if
such markets are relatively few in number, lower courts might be
able to spare significant sectors of the economy from the disruption
that an unbridled application of Kodak would cause. The prospects
for confining Kodak on that basis, however, seem slim. The Kodak
Court did not define the term "complex durable goods," nor does
the economic literature provide a definition of that particular term.
Moreover, markets for "durable goods," a well-defined term, are so
numerous as to constitute but a small limitation on Kodak's scope.
Economists define the term "durable goods" in a number of
ways. They are defined variously as those "[g]oods which are not
intended for consumption immediately or at one time"; 146 goods
which "yield a flow of services into the future"; 147 "[g]oods which
can be used over and over again"; 148 and goods "expected to last
longer than three years."' 149 The economics literature contains no
definition of the term "complex durable goods." Because most goods
are "durable" to some degree, however, the term "durable goods"
is often used to denote "relatively expensive, technologically sophis-
ticated" goods, such as "washing machines, automobiles and TV
sets."' 50 Each of these definitions obviously embraces a wide vari-
ety of product markets. None would substantially limit Kodak, be-
cause each eliminates from consideration only markets for services
and short-lived goods.
Instead of focusing on particular markets, lower courts could
contain Kodak by limiting its application to "difficult and costly" in-
formation gaps, like the "lifecycle pricing" problem encountered by
144. It is not clear from the Kodak opinion whether both of these factors must exist
simultaneously in order for Kodak's analysis to apply, but it seems that each indepen-
dently can create the market-power-without-market-share that is the hallmark of the Ko-
dak holding.
145. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2087.
146. DONALD W. MOFFAT, ECONOMICS DICTIONARY 93 (2d ed. 1983).
147. JOHN EATWELL ET AL., THE NEW PALGRAVE, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 588
(1987).
148. ERWIN E. NEMMERS, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 139 (3d ed. 1974).
149. CHRISTINE AMMER & DEAN S. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS & ECONOMICS 90
(1977).
150. DOUGLAS A.L. AULD ET AL., THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 84 (1983).
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Kodak's buyers.' 5 ' Measurement problems aside, this tack seems
no more promising than a market-oriented approach to limitation.
If lifecycle pricing, and its attendant difficulties, is meant to serve as
a metaphor for all significant information gaps, then the durable
goods markets are full of such gaps: the problems associated with
determining product quality, for example, are no less daunting.
And if, improbably, the Court meant to confine the Kodak methodo-
logy strictly to lifecycle pricing, Kodak would still not be well-con-
tained. Buyers of all durable goods must engage in lifecycle pricing.
Because they cannot do so accurately without adequate information
about product quality, along with a host of other factors, "difficult
and costly" information gaps would seem to be ubiquitous.
Finally, lower courts considering the rationale of Kodak, and
not just its vocabulary, will likely feel bound, logically and equitably,
to extend its application to almost every market and information
gap. Kodak's rationale suggests that in any competitive market-not
just those for complex goods-substantial information gaps of many
kinds can prevent consumers from making rational decisions and
permit relatively small sellers to act as if they were monopolists.
Lower courts may reason that, wherever those kinds of information
gaps exist, antitrust law should treat sellers as "powerful," no mat-
ter what their market share, in order to reflect best the competitive
reality created by the informational imbalance. If so, Kodak has no
effective limits.
To understand further why a limited application of Kodak might
be unfair, consider the composition of Kodak's consumer group, the
buyers unable to bridge the market's information gaps. According
to the Supreme Court, these buyers were "federal, state, and local
government agencies, banks, insurance companies, industrial enter-
prises, and providers of specialized copy and microfilming serv-
ices."' 152 They were, in other words, one of the most sophisticated
and resourceful groups of consumers imaginable. Kodak implicitly
protects these highly sophisticated consumers, by ascribing "market
power" to those who sell to them, on account of information gaps
that are "difficult and costly" for those consumers to close. Lower
courts might well decide that this form of protection should extend
equally to less sophisticated consumers in less complicated markets,
who face informational imperfections of the same relative degree of
151. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2085-86
(1992).
152. Id. at 2077.
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difficulty and cost. From that perspective, Kodak's rationale would,
again, embrace almost every seller in almost every market.
Additionally, given the numerous types of potentially signifi-
cant information gaps and the variety of other market imperfections
that could seriously disadvantage consumers, lower courts might
well extend Kodak to cover all market failures that satisfy the "diffi-
cult and costly" standard. As an example of one such market fail-
ure, consider the problem of heterogeneous goods.' 5 3 As a
market's sellers increasingly and consciously differentiate their
products from each other's through advertising, design changes and
other techniques, accurate interbrand comparisons for buyers in
that market are likely to become "difficult and costly.' 54 Lower
courts could rationally decide that this type of market imperfection
confers upon sellers the same kind of "market power" condemned
in Kodak.
b. Problems of Self-Defense.-Kodak creates at least one other ma-
jor problem. The means that Kodak suggests for avoiding antitrust
liability are dysfunctional, in part because they threaten to raise
other antitrust questions, and in part because they are highly im-
practical. In order, for example, to avoid the "market power" label
that Kodak would bestow upon companies in markets with "difficult
and costly" information gaps, firms may significantly increase the
advertising of their products or adopt other, more individualized,
techniques for informing potential customers about their products'
relevant features and long-term costs and savings.
By increasing their advertising to foreclose informational
problems, however, firms could encounter at least three risks. First,
if all firms advertised extensively, the advertisements might differen-
tiate their products from one another sufficiently to create pockets
of market power-achieved through the failure of the market to of-
fer homogeneous goods' 5 5-and thereby subject those firms to the
strict antitrust scrutiny that they were trying to avoid. Second, be-
153. Recall that perfectly homogeneous goods are one of the preconditions of a per-
fectly competitive market; if goods are exactly alike in appearance, function, longevity,
etc., buyers can easily decide between them on the basis of price. See HOVENKAMP, supra
note 42, at 2; STIGLER, supra note 41, at 87-88.
154. For a discussion and bibliography of the debate over whether advertising is
harmful or beneficial to consumers, see Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Efficiency and
Image: Advertising as an Antitrust Issue, 1990 DUKE L.J. 321.
155. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 31, 518.1e ("[D]ifferentiated prod-
ucts are not perfectly interchangeable for consumers.").
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cause of the economic externalities 56 associated with advertising,
firms that do not advertise often benefit from the heightened con-
sumer interest created by those that do. Would-be advertisers
might therefore be reluctant to produce information whose value
would have to be shared with the competition, resulting in the dis-
semination of too little information and the persistence of the criti-
cal information gaps. Finally, because many significant information
gaps inhere in the structure of particular markets and are impossible
to remedy through advertising, efforts by firms to close those gaps
may be futile or prohibitively expensive. 5 7
The problem of "switching costs" is no easier for firms to cor-
rect. Recall that the Court in Kodak defined a switching cost as "the
cost to current owners of switching to a different product."' 58 It
deemed those costs burdensome because Eastman Kodak sold its
own equipment and, although "expensive when new," that equip-
ment had "little resale value."' 59 According to the Court, the pres-
ence of switching costs provided Kodak with a second, independent
source of "market power." 1
6 0
In order to lower these costs and spare themselves the "market
power" designation, firms have three unattractive options. First,
firms can lease their equipment under terms permitting the lessees
to switch, without cost, to any competitive brand at any time during
the lease term. This option might avoid the problem of low resale
value, 16 ' but it would almost certainly be highly unprofitable for les-
156. An externality is any "activity that affects others for better or worse, without
those others paying or being paid for the activity." SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, Supra note
36, at 905.
157. See supra notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
158. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2087 (1992).
159. Id. at 2077. The Court did not define the terms "expensive" or "little."
160. See id. at 2087. Of course, although the Kodak Court describes the information
gaps and switching costs in Kodak's market as independent bases for its finding of possi-
ble market power, for Kodak to exert power over its buyers, those two factors had to co-
exist. Information gaps, once bridged, can be rendered harmless by low switching costs;
high switching costs, in a competitive market with complete information, must be re-
garded as a possibly disagreeable part of a package whose benefits to the buyer must, by
definition, outweigh its costs. In theory, though, information gaps and switching costs
need not be coupled in this manner, largely because if information gaps go undetected
by buyers, or allow the seller to make sales that would not otherwise have occurred, the
existence of high switching costs becomes much less relevant.
161. This option necessarily assumes that firms would not attempt to recoup their
investment in equipment research and development by charging a high price, payable at




sor-firms. 162 Second, firms can reduce the sales price of their equip-
ment, making it "inexpensive" and narrowing the difference
between the purchase and resale prices. In a competitive market,
however, firms presumably offer their equipment at the lowest pos-
sible price-because doing otherwise would forsake additional
sales-and, therefore, forcing those businesses to drop prices below
the competitive level would effectively drive them out of business.
Third, firms could attempt somehow to maintain the resale value of
their equipment at relatively "high" levels. Because the low resale
value of older equipment is often attributable to technological im-
provements in new goods, however, those attempts could succeed
only through a conscious, and probably illegal, effort to stifle tech-
nological progress.
At bottom, firms can do little to protect themselves from the
implications of Kodak.' 61 Some information gaps simply cannot be
bridged. The elimination of others may, by reducing product ho-
mogeneity, create a different kind of market imperfection, logically
indistinguishable from informational failure and equally likely to re-
sult in a finding of "market power." Companies can reduce "switch-
ing costs" only by committing commercial suicide or by eschewing
technological advances. Firms seeking to shield themselves from
the Kodak holding thus have no effective form of self-defense.
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING KODAK
Given the enormous implications of Kodak and the apparent ab-
sence of intrinsic limits to the sweep of its rationale, what, if any-
thing, can lower courts do to avoid the seemingly intractable
problems raised by the opinion? Three options suggest themselves,
though not with equal force: (1) limit Kodak as strictly as possible to
its own facts; (2) devise a rough, relative measure of the cost and
162. It could also, as in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295
(D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), eliminate the markets for used
machinery and used parts, preventing technology transfer and potentially forestalling
the emergence of new firms in the primary equipment market.
163. One might wonder why firms wishing to avoid the implications of Kodak would
not simply permit the competition in service that Kodak restricted. In a presumably com-
petitive market like Kodak's, however, firms that restrict service do so because they think
that they can provide the service more efficiently-at lower cost, higher quality, or a
better mix. For these firms, allowing the additional competition would be counter-
productive, usually because buyers aggrieved by the workings of that firm's product may
"really" be complaining about the poor service or parts of the independents. If Kodak
provides all the service, and maintains control over its quality, it can remedy those buyer




difficulty of overcoming the information gaps described in Kodak,
and determine a firm's market power through a formula that factors
together market share and measured market imperfections; or (3)
add to the Kodak analysis a requirement of causation, limiting its
analysis to cases in which the defendant has either caused or exacer-
bated the information gap at issue. 64
A. Limit Kodak to Its Facts
An obvious way to limit the reach of Kodak is to restrict its appli-
cability to cases with very similar facts. Lower courts could decide,
for example, that Kodak's methodology for determining market
power should apply only to markets for "complex durable goods,"
and only to those markets demonstrating the same kind of informa-
tional imperfections and switching costs discussed in Kodak. To ac-
complish this, the next court encountering a similar dispute will
have to fashion a workable, narrow definition of "complex durable
goods."
As should be evident, however, a narrow reading of Kodak
would not accomplish much, nor is it likely to be either logical or
fair. 165 By any definition, there seem to be many markets for "com-
plex durable goods," all with "costly and difficult" problems of life-
cycle pricing and high switching costs. Certainly, this approach
would shield some markets and market failures from the Kodak hold-
ing, but only at a cost in logic and fairness that most lower courts
would refuse to incur. For these reasons, most courts are likely to
reject the option of containing Kodak by strict interpretation.
B. Develop a Rough Methodology for Measuring and Comparing
Information Gaps
The market power analysis announced in Kodak was apparently
triggered by the Supreme Court's finding that the informational im-
perfections associated with lifecycle pricing were "difficult and
costly" to remedy. Presumably, if those imperfections could have
been alleviated with little or no difficulty and at little or no expense,
they would have had no effect on the determination of market
power. Given the importance of the "difficult and costly" require-
ment to Kodak's market power analysis, the Court's failure to define
164. Of course, these suggestions are not mutually exclusive and could be used in
combination with one another. A court could, for example, decide to limit the applica-
tion of Kodak strictly to its facts (or certain of them, for example, the market for "com-
plex durable goods") and adopt as well the causation requirement.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 141-153.
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those terms, though understandable in view of the enormity of the
measurement problems entailed, is especially problematic. It does,
however, present lower courts with an opportunity to constrain Ko-
dak's effect.
The impossibility of formulating a precise definition of the "dif-
ficult-and-costly" standard should not dissuade lower courts from
attempting to structure a working definition of that term. Although
many markets have significant informational imperfections, markets
differ in this respect, often by degrees of magnitude that are observ-
able, if not measurable. Some markets provide consumers with sub-
stantial amounts of useful information,' 66 while others furnish very
little.' 67 With the help of expert testimony from information econo-
mists, courts could translate these rough truths into a classification
system that divided markets according to whether their relative de-
grees of informational imperfections were, for example, "high,"
"medium," or "low."
Courts would then be able to use that type of classification sys-
tem in at least two arguably functional ways. Courts might decide
that every firm in markets classified as "high" in informational im-
perfections should be considered to possess market power, and that
no firm in markets designated "low" or "medium" should be so
deemed. Alternatively, a hybrid system that mixed market classifica-
tion and market share might be devised: in a market with "high"
levels of informational imperfections, a defendant could be judged
"powerful" even though it had a very low market share; in markets
with decreasing levels of imperfections, only firms with increasingly
higher market shares would be viewed as "powerful."
Admittedly, this type of classification system would be inexact
and could be attacked as arbitrary. It does, however, seem feasible
to develop and apply. Information economists could develop a grid
of factors that consumers should know in order to be reasonably
well-informed about a particular market. Through observation and
survey, they might then measure the market for the presence of
those factors, grading it as "high," "medium," or "low," on the ba-
sis of the extent of its failure to provide the theoretically "adequate"
level of information. Despite their obvious drawbacks, techniques
166. Detailed and comprehensive information on consumer products such as
automobiles and stereo equipment is available through numerous specialty periodicals
and consumer purchasing guides. See, e.g., Car & Driver, Road & TracA, Consumer Reports.
167. The markets for legal and medical services, for example, impose substantial ob-
stacles on consumers who wish to engage in comparative pricing, or who desire to mea-
sure relative levels of quality.
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of this type would arguably permit lower courts to limit Kodak in
ways that would recognize the difference between larger and smaller
information gaps. Coupled with a causation requirement such as
that described below, they could confine the scope of Kodak in a
manner that would be fair and effective.
C. Add a Causation Requirement to Kodak's Market Power Analysis
Kodak does not specifically address whether a small firm argua-
bly made powerful by an information gap must have caused that gap
in order for the "market power" designation to stick. Kodak's si-
lence on this point leads logically to an inference that causation
does not matter and that a firm can derive "market power" even
from structural information gaps. Because the Court was silent on
this point, however, the inference about the irrelevance of causation
need not be inevitable. Lower courts could conceivably find room
within Kodak's analysis to include a causation requirement as a pre-
condition to a finding of market power.
A causation requirement would limit the use of imperfect infor-
mation as proof of market power to cases where the plaintiff first
demonstrates that the defendant either caused or aggravated the in-
formation gap at issue. Such a requirement would differ from the
causation element in a negligence action. Rather than demanding
proof of a causative link between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's
harm, this causation requirement would call for proof of the link
between defendant's conduct and the information gaps claimed to
have given the defendant market power.
Because informational imperfections often occur structurally,
without any action on the part of sellers, 168 a causation requirement
would prevent courts from ascribing market power to small firms
that have neither generated nor abused the imperfections in their
market. It would also prevent buyers from taking unfair advantage
of market imperfections that they have created or exacerbated.
These outcomes would significantly restrict the scope of Kodak.
Problems of proof of causation most likely would be substantial for
many plaintiffs, thus eliminating many potential Kodak claims at the
summary judgment stage.
More to the point, a causation requirement would be fair. In
the first place, it would preclude courts from labeling as "powerful"
small firms in markets with ineradicable structural imperfections. In
a very real sense, such firms have had market power "thrust upon"
168. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
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them; their mere presence in a particular kind of market accounts
for their "power," which they can discard only by abandoning that
market. A causation requirement would acknowledge and eliminate
this predicament.
Second, a causation standard would provide smaller firms with
a method of predicting, and thus avoiding, liability under Kodak.
Without such a standard, any firm in an "imperfect" market could
be found to possess market power; exiting the market would be the
only way to insure against such a finding. With a causation require-
ment, however, small firms could adjust their behavior so as to avoid
the "market power" label, a consequence beneficial to the market,
equitable to the firms involved, and in line with the procompetitive
goals of the antitrust laws.
It might be argued that adding a causation requirement to Ko-
dak's market power analysis would be unfair. If defendants have
benefited from market imperfections by charging supracompetitive
prices, why should they not be regarded as possessed of market
power, regardless of their role in creating or exacerbating those im-
perfections? This argument is another with "intuitive appeal," yet it
fails for two reasons. First, its logical conclusion would make every
firm a potential possessor of "market power," changing antitrust
law completely and condemning small firms to the risk of treble
damage payments 69 simply for having decided to enter a market
that turned out, after judicial reflection, to contain "difficult and
costly" informational imperfections. The disincentives to business
initiative under such a regime seem overwhelming. Second, the
other half of the causation requirement-the part that would confer
power upon firms that have aggravated existing market imperfec-
tions-is intended to capture for closer antitrust scrutiny only those
small firms that have done something more than benignly exist and
compete in their markets.
The causation requirement would not necessarily operate as an
escape hatch from Kodak, but it would clearly limit Kodak's applica-
bility. Without proof that they caused or aggravated the informa-
tion gaps in their markets, firms with small market shares could
escape the reach of Kodak, perhaps at the summary judgment stage.
Furthermore, they would receive some essential guidance about
how to avoid antitrust violations. A causation requirement would
169. See, e.g., Clayton Act § 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988) (allowing an antitrust plain-
tiff to "recover three-fold the damages by him sustained").
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thus be sensible, educational, and fair, and might also breathe new
life into the role of summary judgment in antitrust jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Kodak is arguably the most important antitrust decision of the
past twenty years. Unfortunately, it is a disaster. By changing the
traditional approach to market power analysis and discarding the
market share proxy in cases involving markets with significant infor-
mation gaps, the Supreme Court has effectively decided that every
firm may possess market power, regardless of its market share.
Philosophically, this decision breaks with precedent, marks an ab-
rupt shift in the direction of antitrust law, and signals a sharp altera-
tion in the terms of the judicial debate about the proper bases of
competition policy. Practically, it creates serious definitional and
measurement problems for lower courts, greatly diminishes the pos-
sibility of successful motions for summary judgment, contains no
logical or fair limiting principles, and denies prospective antitrust
defendants the means to avoid the heightened judicial scrutiny to
which it subjects them.
If the staggering implications of Kodak are to be contained,
lower courts must avail themselves of the few doctrinal loopholes
that it leaves open. By developing some rough measures of infor-
mational failure and coupling them with a requirement obligating
plaintiffs to prove that defendants either caused or aggravated the
informational gaps at issue, lower courts have an opportunity to
limit the damage that Kodak threatens, to revitalize the role of sum-
mary judgment in antitrust proceedings, and to provide some much-
needed predictability to potential defendants.
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